

MIT Anti-Tampering THz-ID Technology

Ruonan Han

Associate Professor


Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology


Collaborator: Anantha Chandrakasan, Dean of School Engineering, MIT

ruonan@mit.edu, <https://hangroup.mit.edu>


Terahertz Integrated Circuits and Systems at MIT




CMOS 220-320GHz Gas Spectrometer (ISSCC 2017)



1-THz Radiator Array (JSSC 2018)



0.24-THz Heterodyne Imaging Array (JSSC 2019)




Cryptographic THz-ID (ISSCC 2020)




High-Resolution THz Comb Radar (ISSCC 2020)




CMOS-NV Quantum Magnetometer (ISSCC 2019)




100Gbps Link via THz Dielectric Waveguide (ISSCC 2021)




0.26-GHz Orbital-Angular-Momentum Transceiver (JSSC 2022)




4K-300K THz Backscatter Wireless Link (ISSCC 2023)




140GHz Radar with Loss-Free TX-RX Antenna Sharing (ISSCC 2022)



0.3-THz Energy Harvester (RFIC 2022)



0.3-THz 98x98 Beam-Forming Array (ISSCC 2022)




Anti-Tampering THz-ID (ISSCC 2024)

What's the Missing Opportunity in THz Wireless?



USAF PAVE-PAWS Radar ($f=0.4$ GHz)

2.2° beamwidth, 2677 antennas, 22x22 m²





MIT-Intel CMOS Reflectarray ($f=265$ GHz)

1° beamwidth, 9604 antennas, 0.05x0.05 m²






Ultra-Miniaturization of Wireless Hardware

THz-ID: Ultra-Miniaturized Tag with Built-In Security






THz-ID: 1.5mm² Tag with 260-GHz Backscatter Communication and Built-In Security
[M. Ibrahim, et al., ISSCC 2020, JSSC 2021 (Invited)]

First Prototype: Principle and Experimental Results



- 5-cm operation distance
- Built-in ECC authentication processor
- Photovoltaic powering


THz-to-DC Energy Harvester in CMOS




- **Recent progress: 260-GHz energy harvesting in CMOS (22nm FinFET)**
 - 15% THz-to-DC efficiency @ -8dBm input power
 - 25 μ W output DC power
 - *Highest frequency of CMOS RF harvester*




Anti-Tampering Function




Conventional Anti-Tampering Approach



Sub-THz Anti-Tampering ID Using THz Backscattering



System Architecture



Sub-THz Wave Scattering Detection

- Slot pairs

Communication



- Downlink (OOK)
- Uplink (BPSK)

Self-powering



- Photovoltaic harvesting

Sub-THz Fingerprinting at Chip-item Interface

- Substrate-mode wave radiation below the chip using slot
- Sub-THz waves scattering varies with 3D material distribution under chip.
- Scattering detection using radiating & sensing slot pair









Two-State Beam-Reconfigurable Radiating Slot




- Two-state phase shifter for beam-reconfigurability
- Beam-steered towards the upper/lower side of the chip substrate

Simulated Inter-Slot Coupling Responses




Tag Operation (1) – Downlink




- Sub-THz wave captured by patch antenna
- 1:1 power splitting between THz square-law detector and slot pairs

Tag Operation (2) – Sub-THz Scattering Detection




- Sub-THz signal is re-radiated by metal slot
- Injected to the silicon substrate and 3D distribution below the chip

Tag Operation (3) – Uplink





- Probed Sub-THz wave backscattered back to reader (at $f_{RF} \pm f_m$)
- LO for backscatter - f_m signal is frequency divided ($\div 2$) from the THz detector

Die Micrograph





- 65nm CMOS process
- Metal shield for optical insensitivity on downlink circuits
- Photodiodes filled in all empty regions

Measurement Setup for Fingerprint Acquisition



Measurement Setup for Fingerprint Acquisition


- Experimental setup for modifying the glue distribution under the chip






Measured Sub-THz Fingerprint

Measured amplitude difference between two samples


Sample #1 image




Sample #2 image





Same sample
– different switching mode



Same switching mode
– different samples



Neural Network Based Fingerprint Authentication



Conclusions

- This work shows first sub-THz packageless anti-tampering tag
- Slot-based sub-THz wave scattering detection technique
- Beam-steering technique is used to provide spatial diversity
- Sub-THz BPSK backscatter to suppress cross-polarization leakage from patch antenna
- Neural-network-based authentication algorithm is demonstrated for fingerprint authentication

System performance



Technology	65nm CMOS
Carrier frequency	261 – 265 GHz
Main feature	Tamper-evidence
Modulation	Downlink: OOK Uplink: BPSK
Analog power	5.1uW
Digital power	0.92uW
Harvesting method	Photovoltaic energy
Die area	4.2 mm ²





A Packageless Anti-Tampering Tag Utilizing Unclonable Sub-THz Wave Scattering at the Chip-Item Interface

E. Lee, X. Chen, M. Ashok, J. Won, A. Chandrakasan and R. Han
IEEE Intl. Solid-State Circuit Conf. (ISSCC), San Francisco, CA, Feb. 2024.

THz Wake-Up Receiver for Ultra-Miniaturized Sensing Platform



EM wake-up receiver




• 260-GHz CMOS wake-up receiver



[E. Seok, et al., *CICC* 2023, *JSSC* 2024 (Invited)]

- The smallest RF wake-up receiver (1.5mm²)
- 750nW DC power
- Built-in security authentication against denial-of-sleep attack

Demonstrations



Tx - WuRx Distance	Bit Error Rate (BER)
5.1 m	5.7×10^{-3}
7.6 m	1.7×10^{-2}



Location of the WuRx @ 30° (Nominal)

